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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAYE DORIS HURST, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs, 
LARRY W.HURST, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 890129-CA 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Rules 3 (a) and 4(a) of the Utah Court of Appeals 
confer Jurisdiction upon this court to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce and Judgment 
entered January 30, 1989 by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, of the 
Third District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Were the restrictions on Defendant's right to 
visitation justified in the Findings of Fact and in the record? 
2. Was the child support order justified in the 
Findings of Fact and in the Record? 
3. Was the restraining order justified by the record? 
4. Was the requirement that the Defendant provide life 
insurance justified by the Findings of Fact and the Record? 
5. Was the division of marital property justified in 
the Findings of Fact and by the Record? 
6. Was the award of attorneyfs fees justified by the 
Findings of Fact and by the Record? 
7. Was the judgment against the Defendant justified by 
the Findings of Fact and by the Record? 
8. Were the issues presented in this appeal properly 
preserved for review? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISION 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this case. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint was filed in this matter on August 13, 
1987 (R 2), after the parties had already been separated for one 
year (R 18). An Order to Show Cause hearing came before 
Commissioner Peuler, and over Defendant's objections, her 
recommendations were upheld, including the recommendation that 
Defendant maintain any life insurance policies currently in effect 
(R 37-39). 
On October 27, 1987, Plaintiff mailed Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories and Request for Admissions, and Request for 
Production of Documents to Defendant (R 36). Defendant responded 
to the Request for Admissions, but failed to respond to the 
Interrogatories or Request for Production of Documents, and on 
December 23, 1987, Plaintiff moved the court for an Order 
Compelling Answers to Interrogatories and Reply to Request for 
Production of Documents (R 49). A hearing on this motion took 
place on January 22, and the court ordered Defendant to respond (R 
79), reserving for later the issue of attorney's fees (R 79). 
This matter came on for trial on September 26, 1988 in 
the Third District Court with the honorable Judge Raymond S. Uno 
presiding. 
Prior to the trial, the court met with counsel in 
chambers wherein the matter was discussed thoroughly and certain 
3 
representations made (TR 3). Also, certain stipulations of 
counsel were made concerning Defendant's restricted visitation 
(TR 4/6), and the value of the parties1 marital home and real 
property (TR 7). There is no transcript of what was said or what 
representations were made in the court's chambers, 
A rather informal trial was held. Plaintiff testified 
to the effect that ISAT had required Defendant to leave the 
marital residence before the minor child could be returned to the 
home (TR 21). 
The Plaintiff's Financial Declaration (R 84-85) was 
available to the court at the time of the trial stating her income 
and expenditures, but the Defendant had failed to submit a 
Financial Declaration, even though the Notice of Pretrial 
Settlement Conference specifically informed the Defendant of 
certain consequences of his failure to file a Financial 
Declaration (R 83)• There was lengthy testimony concerning 
Defendant's income and benefits from Ms. Betty Phelps, the Human 
Resources Coordinator of the Defendant's employer, Newspaper 
Agency Corporation. 
In Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Plaintiff requested 
that the court order Defendant to maintain existing life insurance 
on his life (R 7). In Commissioner Peuler's Temporary Order, the 
Defendant was ordered to maintain current life insurance on his 
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life (R 38). In Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories, Defendant stated that he was going to let a life 
insurance policy lapse (R 106). In trial, Ms. Phelps testified 
that a life insurance policy in the amount of Defendant's yearly 
earnings was available to Defendant at minimal cost (TR 15). 
As to the division of the Defendant's pension, there was 
a proffer of testimony from Charles E. Petersen of Frank Stuart 
and Associates, who was present at the trial, that the value of 
the Defendant's pension was $76,328.00 and that during the 
pendency of the action Defendant had received $18,316.63 payments 
from the pension plan (TR 5). A complete analysis was submitted 
on what was marked as Defendant's Exhibit 2 (R 120). The parties 
agreed on the value of the parties' marital residence at 
$37,000.00 (TR 6). Using these valuations, the court entered its 
Findings of Fact stating that the marital residence would go to 
Plaintiff. The court further found that the $18,316.63 that 
Defendant had received from his pension after the separation of 
the parties but for which Defendant had failed to make any 
accounting, along with 10% simple interest on that amount, would 
be considered in determining the Plaintiff's share of the pension. 
The court determined that the entire pension was a marital asset, 
and to compensate for Plaintiff's receiving the marital residence 
which was worth almost $17,000.00 more than the pre-dissolution 
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pension payments the Defendant had received, the court determined 
that 39% of each pension payment would go to Plaintiff and that 
the remaining 61% would go to Defendant (TR 316-319). 
While the court and the counsel met in chambers, 
Plaintiff's counsel proffered that his requested attorney's fees 
were necessary and reasonable. This proffer was not transcribed. 
Evidence of this testimony is apparent in the court's minute entry 
that $1,500.00 in attorney's fees had been awarded to Plaintiff (R 
94). The Plaintiff's need for attorney's fees is apparent in the 
Financial Declaration that Plaintiff filed (R 84-88). In its 
Findings of Fact, the court clearly finds that the ordered 
attorney's fees were necessary and reasonable and based on 
Plaintiff's need (R 328-329). 
The court determined that the additional judgment for 
$1,100.00 was necessary due to the fact that the valuation of the 
pension was as of the trial date, but the Decree was not entered 
until the end of January, 198 9. If this had not been done, 
Defendant would have received four pension payments without any 
accountability to the Plaintiff. This is made clear in the Decree 
(R 336) . 
The Defendant objected to Plaintiff's proposed Findings 
of Fact and a hearing was held to determine the issues raised in 
the Defendant's Objections, in which the court took the matter 
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under advisement (R 131,132). After the hearing, pursuant to the 
court's request, the Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities supporting the Plaintiff's position. After 
receiving the Plaintiff's Memorandum, the court asked the 
Defendant for an opposing memorandum (R 204), but the Defendant 
failed to submit one. Thereafter, the court asked the Plaintiff 
to submit new Findings of Fact in accordance with his Memorandum 
and what had been determined at the hearing (R 310). A new set of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted and entered 
by the court with no further objections from the Defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiff's main argument is that the Findings of 
Fact set forth a fair and equitable amount of child support, child 
visitation, life insurance, property division, and attorney's 
fees, and that these matters are supported by the record and by 
the stipulation of the parties. 
The second argument is that the record before the Court 
of Appeals is not a record of the entire proceedings and does not 
reflects the arguments, representations and stipulations made by 
the parties in the court's chambers. Since it is the duty of the 
Appellant to provide the appellate court with the complete record, 
the appellate court should affirm the lower court's decision. 
The third argument that Plaintiff will raise is that the 
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Defendant failed to argue his points in the lower court, so he 
should be denied the opportunity to argue his points at the 
appellate level. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE RESTRICTION ON DEFENDANT'S 
VISITATION WAS PROPER 
After meeting in chambers, without any transcriptions 
taking place, the parties stipulated that Defendant's visitation 
with the minor child would be with the approval of Judith Pugh of 
ISAT. Findings of Fact can be set aside on appeal only if they 
are clearly erroneous, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a). 
Whether Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous cannot be 
determined "unless an Appellant first marshals all the evidence 
that supports the trial court's finding." Bake v. Bake, 772 P. 2d 
461, 465-466 (Utah Ct. App., 1989), see also, Cornish Town v. 
Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah, 1988); and, Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1983). It is 
apparent from the transcript that representations were made in 
chambers and that stipulations concerning these representations 
were agreed upon (TR 4). Since the Appellant has failed to 
provide the Court of Appeals with any record of what was said or 
represented in chambers, any arguments as to the insufficiency of 
the record to support the findings should be denied. 
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The parties stipulated that Defendant's visitation with 
the minor child be limited by the direction of Judith Pugh (TR 4). 
The Defendant should now be bound by what he stipulated to. 
"Stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties unless 
good cause is demonstrated warranting relief therefrom," Sorenson 
v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 820, 833 (Utah Ct. App., 1989). Defendant 
shows no good cause for not upholding the parties' stipulation and 
only argues sufficiency of the evidence. Plaintiff was available 
to testify concerning visitation, but her testimony was not 
proffered or elicited concerning visitation, because the parties 
had stipulated concerning it (TR 5). The Defendant should not be 
allowed to avoid a stipulation because little testimony was heard 
due to the very fact that the parties had stipulated to 
visitation. 
The record does have some indications of the reasons for 
restricted visitation. The Plaintiff testified that Protective 
Services would not return the minor child to the marital residence 
unless the Defendant moved out (TR 21). Defendant did not testify 
as to why he should not be restricted in his visitation with his 
daughter. The court made findings that the parties were currently 
being counseled through the ISAT center (R, 325). This finding is 
based on the references to the ISAT center and the counselor Judy 
Pugh (TR 4, 21). These references indicate that the court heard 
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of the role of the ISAT center before the trial began. 
The facts that visitation was stipulated to between the 
parties, that the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant was 
ordered out of the house by Protective Services be^ fore the minor 
could be returned to the marital residence, that there was no 
contradictory testimony from the Defendant, and that the court 
made a finding which gave a basis for its conclusion as to limited 
visitation, all support the Court of Appeals deciding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the 
Defendant1s visitation. 
Point II 
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD WAS PROPER 
Defendant consistently has failed to produce evidence of 
his income, his expenses, his ability to pay, and his support of 
others. As evidence of this, see Defendant's response to 
Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents (R 95), in which 
Defendant denied having any documents at all except tax forms, 
which he refused to allow Plaintiff to copy in direct denial of 
Rule 34 (a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states 
that the party making the request may inspect and copy the 
documents requested. Defendant's failure to provide financial 
information is also evidenced by Defendant's failure to file a 
Financial Declaration as he was ordered by the Notice of Pre-Trial 
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Settlement Hearing (R 83) . 
The child support award was examined closely in the 
hearing on Defendant's Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment. This is evidenced by 
the changes in the child support provisions from the originally 
proposed Findings of Fact, in which Plaintiff was to receive a 
percentage of Defendant's income above the base amount (R 217-
220) , and the Findings of Fact entered by the court (R 325-326). 
The trial court had available to it evidence concerning 
all the factors set out in Section 78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated 
(1984), and most were reviewed by counsel and the court in 
chambers prior to the trial as well as at the hearing on 
Defendant's Objection to the first proposed set of findings and 
those presented to the court were incorporated in the Findings of 
Fact ultimately entered by the court. Paragraph 48 of the 
Findings of Fact covers the wealth and income of the Defendant, 
Paragraph 49 covers the wealth and income of the Plaintiff, 
Paragraph 50 covers the situation of the child and Plaintiff and 
the need of the obligee (R 326). Again, to the extent Defendant 
had evidence indicating otherwise, he should have presented this 
at trial. 
As for the factors that the trial court did not include 
in its Findings of Fact, the age of the parties was apparent to 
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the court, since both were present at the trial, and the 
responsibility of the obligor for the support of others was not 
brought out, even though the court sought out this information 
prior to the trial by requiring that Defendant file a Financial 
Declaration (R 83), which was never done. The Defendant neither 
proffered evidence nor testified concerning his living situation* 
The Plaintiff did testify that the Defendant was living with 
another woman (TR 2 2), but there was no testimony concerning 
Defendant's support of her or his duty to support her. Indeed, 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendant 
indicate that Defendant was residing only with a friend (R 110), 
and had Defendant provided Plaintiff with any of the records that 
Plaintiff asked for in her Request for Production of Documents, 
any payments that he was making for the support of others would 
have been clear, but no documents were supplied (R 95-99). 
At trial the court left open the issue of child support 
in order to determine whether Defendant would continue his 
employment at the same level of income pending confirmation of his 
income from the Director of Human Resources (TR 23,24). His 
continued employment at the same level of income was subsequently 
verified (R 139). The amount of support to be ultimately paid by 
Defendant was determined using the Utah Child Support guidelines 
in effect at that time with the analysis thoroughly explained in 
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the Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R 257, 258) and Findings 
of Fact (TR 326, 327). Thus, the amount of child support awarded 
by the trial court should be upheld. 
Again, in Defendant's second point on appeal he is 
arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the Findings, 
but the Defendant has again failed to marshall any evidence 
contrary to the Findings entered by the court. Since stipulations 
and representations were entered into in the judge's chambers, and 
no evidence of what was heard or decided in chambers has been 
provided to this appellate court, the Findings entered by the 
trial court should be upheld in accordance with Bake, supra p.7. 
Point III 
THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS PROPER 
The propriety of the restraining order against Defendant 
appears in Appellant's brief as the third issue under Appellant's 
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal. However, no argument or 
authority is presented. Nevertheless, Plaintiff believes this was 
proper and supported by the parties' stipulations in chambers and 
testimony presented during trial that protective services ordered 
Defendant out of the marital residence (TR 21). Accordingly, the 
permanent restraining order should be upheld. 
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Point IV 
THE REQUIREMENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE WAS PROPER 
In its Order Affirming Commissioner's Recommendations (R 
38), the court ordered Defendant maintain his present policy of 
life insurance. In Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories to Defendant, Defendant stated that he had life 
insurance, but that some would lapse in six months from the date 
of the Answers (R 106), given this evidence, which was available 
to the court as well as the evidence presented concerning life 
insurance presented at trial (TR 15), and the prior Temporary 
Order and Defendant's failure to comply with the Order, an order 
to provide life insurance was appropriate. 
Point V 
THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ASSETS WAS PROPER 
The division of the remaining items of property not 
previously divided by the parties is explained in detail in 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities given to the 
trial court (R 133-203). Essentially, the only assets that needed 
a court decision consisted of the parties' home, pre-dissolution 
pension plan payments for which Defendant failed to account, and 
the remaining payments due under Defendant's pension. 
The parties stipulated to the value of the marital 
residence, and evidence was proffered and unrefuted concerning the 
14 
value of the pension. The court made extensive findings 
explaining its division of the marital assets (R 316-324), as 
required by Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah Ct. App., 
1988). Specifically, the court found that the entire pension was 
a marital asset. Defendant argues in his brief that Defendant 
worked for nine months at Kennecott prior to the parties' 
marriage, but Defendant offered no testimony that any portion of 
the pension vested during this period, and it was within the 
court's discretion to determine that the pension was entirely a 
marital asset. The court also awarded the entire marital 
residence, having a value of $37,000 to the Plaintiff, and awarded 
the pension payments received by Defendant prior to the hearing 
but after the separation of the parties to the Defendant, finding 
that none of these payments had been used for family expenses. The 
court then determined that interest should accrue on the pre-
dissolution pension payments and added simple interest at 10% to 
the amounts received, and valued the total at $20,300.86. The 
court further determined, based upon the expert testimony of 
Charles E. Peterson of Frank Stuart and Associates proffered at 
trial, that the present value of the future pension benefits to be 
paid was $76,328.31. The fact that the entirety of the house was 
awarded to Plaintiff is not in itself inequitable. See Bailey v. 
Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah Ct. App., 1987) and King v. King, 717 
15 
P.2d 715 (Utah, 1986). 
Defendant, in his brief relies on Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), but the pension in Woodward was not 
vested, indeed, the Plaintiff in Woodward would have had to work 
an additional 15 y e a r s before his pension would vest. Woodward at 
431. 
In the instant case the pension was fully vested and its 
value determined. In Bailey, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated 
that a present value is calculable if the only contingency is the 
life expectancy of the retire, but when there are other 
contingencies distribution should be postponed, I^ U_ at 831. In 
this case the only contingency is the life expectancy of the 
Defendant, and a division of the entire pension may be had. In 
the present case the pension is being distributed and the question 
is only what percentage should each party get of the pension 
proceeds. The court made an evaluation of the value of the 
marital assets that remained undistributed and determined that the 
Plaintiff could be awarded the house in which she and the minor 
child resided, so long as the amount of pension that she receives 
from the Defendant's pension was reduced accordingly. The court 
made its division according to the undisputed evidence at trial. 
The reviewing court should not disturb the trial court's 
apportionment of marital property unless it is clearly unjust or 
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an abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d. 1076 (Utah, 
1988). Indeed, absent a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion, a reviewing court will not interfere with a property 
award. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. , 
1988). 
The Defendant argues that since no evidence was 
presented at trial that the income received from the Defendant's 
pension by the Defendant during the time of separation was not 
hidden or not accounted for, that the court's consideration of 
this amount in making the property awards was an abuse of 
discretion. In making this argument the Defendant relies on 
Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App., 1989). The facts 
in Johnson are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the 
instant case. In Johnson the parties stipulated to a division of 
property in which all the property to be divided was listed, the 
court determined that property that both parties knew about, but 
which was not on the list, need not be divided. In the present 
case there is no stipulation concerning the division of the 
pension and the Plaintiff has been seeking a portion of the 
Defendant's retirement since the filing of the Complaint (R 16). 
Defendant received monthly payments totalling more than 
$18,000.00 from his pension during the parties' separation. This 
clearly reduced the present value of the pension as it would have 
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been determined at the time of separation from the actual 
determination at the time of trial. "Although assets are 
generally valued at the time of the divorce decree, the trial 
court may value the property at an earlier date where one party 
has dissipated an asset, . . . " Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 
476, 477 (Utah Ct. App., 1988). The court found that Defendant 
had taken this money and that he had failed to make an accounting 
of it (R 318). Since no accounting was made, it was within the 
court's discretion to determine that none of the amounts received 
were used for family expenses, and that therefore the entire 
amount could be used in dividing the marital property. See, 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App., 1988). 
The court also had the right to add interest to the 
amount received by Defendant from his pension. The court used a 
10% simple interest calculation as prescribed by Utah Code 
Annotated Section 15-1-1 (1985). In Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 
649 (Utah Ct. App., 1987) the court determined that interest had 
to be charged on back child support judgments. In Marchant v. 
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App., 1987), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that interest on a property award should be at the 
statutory rate. Since the pension was one-half Plaintiff's in this 
case, she was entitled to receive payments when they were received 
by Defendant. Since none of these payments were received by her or 
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paid for family expenses, she should be entitled to receive the 
statutory rate of interest on the amounts received. This is only 
fair because these pre-dissolution pension paynebts were not used 
by Defendant for family expenses and could have been invested by 
Plaintiff had she received her fair share. Thus, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in imputing interest on this amount 
and crediting this to Defendants side of the ledger 
The Defendant argues that there was no award as to the 
distribution of the residence at the trial, but again, he has 
failed to muster all the evidence of what happened at trial. What 
occurred in the court chambers does not appear in the record, and 
the Defendant's argument as to the insufficiency of the evidence 
should fail under the rationale of Bake, supra, at 7. 
Point VI 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS WAS PROPER 
The issue of attorney's fees was discussed in chambers 
by counsel and the court. The court decided that $1,500.00 in 
attorney's fees should be awarded. This award may have been based 
partly on the general need of the Plaintiff as established in her 
unrefuted Financial Declaration and partly on the unresolved issue 
of attorney's fees incurred in compelling Defendant's answers and 
responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests which had been 
19 
reserved for trial in the Order Compelling Discovery (R 79-80). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) (4) states that if a Motion to 
Compel Discovery is granted, the court shall require the opposing 
party to "pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred 
in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court 
finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust." The court never entered any finding that Defendant's 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order Compelling Answers to 
Interrogatories and Reply to Request for Production of Documents 
was justified or that an award of expenses was unjust. Indeed, 
the Plaintiff might have pursued this matter further given the 
answers that Defendant gave to the Interrogatories and his utter 
failure to produce documents. 
In order to recover attorney's fees the moving party 
must set forth the reasonableness of the award and the need of the 
requesting party. Sorenson, supra p. 8. The Findings indicate that 
the fees requested were reasonable and that they were necessary, 
setting forth the requirements for necessity in its findings. 
Indeed, Plaintiff had sought an award of $4,000.00 (R 328), but 
the court awarded only $1,500.00. Plaintiff's need is evidenced 
in her Financial Declaration which should be held as true and 
correct given Defendant's failure to file any such statement. 
20 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff should not have been 
awarded its costs incurred in filing the action of $82.00 because 
she did not submit a Bill of Costs as required under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 54 (d). However, this is the first time any 
objection has been made by Appellant on the issue of costs. In 
Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and to Decree of Divorce and Judgment Defendant objected only to 
the judgment of $1,500.00 awarded Plaintiff for her attorney's 
fees and nothing was said about the costs of court. Because of 
Defendant's failure to object to the costs of court incurred by 
Plaintiff, he should be deemed to have waived this objection. 
Suniland Corporation v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847 (Utah, 1978). See 
also State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App., 1988). 
Point VII 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS PROPER 
Since the court ordered an equitable division of the 
pension at the trial, and the valuation of the pension was dated 
for September, 1988, the court properly awarded the Plaintiff a 
judgment for the amount she should have received from the date of 
trial up to the entering of the Decree of Divorce and Judgment. 
Had the court failed to award this judgment, the pension 
division set forth in the decree would have been inequitable by 
allowing the Defendant to receive an inequitable share of the 
21 
marital property received by him after the date of trial but prior 
to the entry of the Decree. Plaintiff argues that to do otherwise 
would be contrary to the requirement that the Defendant should be 
required to account for marital property dissipated prior to the 
divorce as set out in Anderson, supra p.17. Since it is the 
court's duty to divide property equitably, Utah Code Annotated, 
section 30-3-5, it would have been an abuse of discretion not to 
have some accounting of all the pension funds received by 
Defendant. 
Point VIII 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAL WERE NOT 
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW 
The Defendant had ample opportunity to raise objections 
to the proposed final Decree of Divorce and Judgment. Indeed, the 
court asked the Defendant to supply a Reply Memoreindum responding 
to Plaintiff fs Memorandum of Points and Authoriti€>s, and since the 
court received no such memorandum, it asked the Plaintiff to 
prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce and Judgment in compliance with the memorandum which the 
Plaintiff had prepared pursuant to the Defendant's original 
objections on the sufficiency of the evidence. Since the 
Defendant made no objections to the Memorandum or to the second 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and 
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Judgment, the court could only have decided that all problems that 
the Defendant had with the originally proposed findings and decree 
had been resolved by the second findings and decree. 
Defendant's objections to the first Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment were mostly 
based on the sufficiency of the evidence, but the Defendant did 
not order a transcript so that the court could determine the facts 
that had been introduced into evidence. Since the Defendant 
failed to provide any evidence supporting his arguments on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the court could not have decided in 
Defendant's favor, but the court allowed the Defendant an 
opportunity to make his argument by asking for a memorandum in 
which he would support his arguments, but the Defendant produced 
no such memorandum. 
Since the Defendant's objections were not pursued 
through preparing a memorandum or objecting to the second Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment, 
and since the Defendant never supported his arguments to the court 
by references to the evidence, Defendant's objections should not 
be preserved for review on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant failed to show the District Court how the 
23 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and 
Judgment would harm the Defendant or be an undue burden, even 
though he was asked to show his need and argue his point through 
Interrogatories, Financial Declarations, testimony/ a memorandum 
of points and authorities and through the availability of an 
objection to the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce and Judgment. Defendant failed to act on his 
own behalf in the lower court, and Plaintiff asks that he be 
prevented from acting now that the case is on appeal, and uphold 
the decision of the Third District Court and award costs to 
Respondent. 
b 7 
M. DIRK EASTMOND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
140 West 9000 South 
Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
r, EILEEN D. OTTI, do hereby certify that on the Y&— 
day ofOU^^t 1989, I hand delivered four (4) true and correct 
copies o'r the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, to 
DON BLACKHAM 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
3535 South 3200 West Street 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ 
EILEEN D. OTTI 
25 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAYE DORIS HURST, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY W. HURST, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 890129-CA 
ADDENDUM TC RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
**************************** 
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO, THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DON BLACKHAM (356) 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 
M. DIRK EASTMOND (951) 
EILEEN D. OTTI (5330) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Responden t 
140 West 9000 South 
Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
84119 
SERVE UPON DPHOMf. COUNSEL AT LEAST 
Fl tXD IN CLERKS OFFICE R V E ® DAyS BEFORE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
In the Third Judical iBwfrwt>t€6tett of Salt Lake County 
„ . . „ _ . „ .Case No D87-3 200 FAY DORIS KURST ierfc|3rd Di&t Ccurt 
vs. 
LARRY W. hURST 
Defendant 
Husband: 
Address 
Deputy ciefi financial Declaration 
Dated. 5 - 2 4 - 8 8 
Wifc. Fay D o r i s H u r s t 
Address: 5242 South 5120 West 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
Soc. Sec. No . 
Occupation _ 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
Soc. Sec. No.: 5 2 8 - 4 8 - 0 7 5 2 
Occupation. C l a s s i f i e d Ads R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
Employer. Newspaper Agency C o r p o r a t i o n 
Birthdate: 3 / 4 / 3 8 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED 
WILL AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE 
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY 
AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive it monthly figures wfcen Income ts received and deductions are 
made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on • bi-weekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
I. Gross monthly income from 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses. 
allowances and overtime, payable (pay 
period) — 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare. AFDC payments, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
AH other sources (Specify) 
TOIAI MONIHI Y INCOME 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income 
Stale and federal income uxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social security 
Average of 1987 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully) H e a l t h $ 5 8 , 4 4 , L i f e $ 8 . 2 5 
Accident 34,50. L-Teito P i s $7.95 
Union or other dues — 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan _ 
HUSBAND 
$ 
5 
$ 
WIFE 
$ 
1 , 1 1 9 . 0 0 | 
$
 1 , 1 1 9 . 0 0 
s 1 
1 5 4 . 0 0 J 
2 
8 3 . 0 0 
7 9 . 1 4 
Other (specify) 
r O I A l MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
3 Net monthtx imome lake home pax 
s 
$ 
S
 316 .14 
' 8 0 2 . 8 6 
4 Debts and obligations 
Creditor 's Name For Date Payable Balance Monthlv Payment 
NAC Credit Union 
Trane Co. Credit Union 
ZCMI 
M. Dirk Eastmond 
Vallev Mental Health 
TOTAI 
$666.00 
529.00 
260.00 
1,200.00 
ISO 00 
s2,805.00 
$66.00 
64.00 
30.00 
?2 nn 
s
 182.00 
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) 
5 All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held (H) Husband (W)Wife (J) Jomtlv) 
W H E R E SPACE IS I N S U F F I C I E N T FOR C O M P L E T E I N F O R M A T I O N OR LISTING PLEASE A T T A C H S E P A R A T E S C H E D U L F 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture. 
appliances, and equipment 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) ' 7 8 Plymouth Sapparo (Fay d r i v e s ) 
'75 Ford Pinto (Larry has) 
2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
300 .00 
250 .00 
• 0 -
76 Chevey Pickup & camper & she l l (Larry lias) 
_1_, 100.00 
(c) Securities - stocks bonds 
(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans, 
credit unions - savings and checking) 
Guardian State Bank (average) LOO.00 
(e) Life Insurance 
Name of Company 
Equitable 
Policy No 
? ' 
NAC 
Face Amount 
s 1.000 
13 .000 
Cash value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
0 
_ Q 
(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name _Xennecott. R e t i r e m e n t 
Name 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
$83,114 (present valnp) 
(g) Other Personal P r o p c m and Assets (spetiK ) 
g u n s , c a m e r a s , develapijig^_£.q.uipment_, sewing m a c h i n e , t o o l s , _ a l l i n 
Larry's possession which are worth $4,000 00 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned attach sheet with identical information for all additional propertv) 
Address 5242 South 1?0 Wpgf 
Original Cost S 1 0 , 7 7 5 . 0 0 
Cost of Additions $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Total Cost $ 1 1 , 7 7 5 . 0 0 
Mtg Balance S Q_ 
Other Liens $ Q_ 
Equity $ __Afl,000 - 45 ,000 
Monthly Amortization S U 
Taxes $ 538 p e r y e a r 
Individual contributions 
Type of Property h o u s e 
2/59 Date of Acquisition 
Total Present Value S 4 0 , 0 0 0 - 4_5L, 0 0 0 
Basis of Valuation R e a l E s J t a t e . R r o k P T - S 
opinion 
And to whom 
(i) Business interest (Indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) IN O n e 
(j) Other assets (Specify) 
Personal effects, Jewelry 
6 Total monthlv expenses '(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose 
expenses are included ) 
Mother, Kaylene Hurst: 
HUSBAND WIFb 
Rent or mortgage pavments (residence) 
Real propcrtN taxes (residence) 538 per year 
Real property insurance (residence) $ 2 0 0 p e r }^ear w h e n a f f o r d a b l e 
Maintenance (residence) _$300,,per year 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities including water electricity, gas and heat 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing contingent on a b i l i t y 
Medical estimated 
Dcmai estimated, minor child needs f i l l i n g s 
Insurance (life health undent comprehensive haJuJitw^ , , , ^r ^
 o r ^ . I , . n . A-> ^r-
disabilit\) Fxcludc Pa\ roll Deducted 
re ^D.DU, neaith » b z . ^ , Disabi l i ty i?/.K 
Child care 
Accideik $4,50 __ I 
Payment ol child spous il support re prior marriage 
School 
I ntertammem (includes clubs social obligations, travel rev nation) 
Incidentals (grooming tobacco alcohol gifts and donations) 
Tr.nsporui.on (other than automob.ic) bus when car needs repair 
Auto expense (gas oil repair insurance) C3T n e e d S O V e r n a U l 
Auto payments 
Installment payment(s) (Insert total and attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) 
TOTA1 EXPENSFS 
_Q_ 
, 44 .83 
16 .67 
25.00 
200 .00 
150 .00 J 
50.00 
25 .00 
100 00 
20 . 00 
20 .00 
JKK30 
5 0 . 0 0 
0 
14 .00 
3 0 . 0 0 
2 5 . 0 0 
5 .00 
120 .00 
__D 
182 .00 
1 , 1 5 7 . 8 0 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
(ma v- si CASE NO: si^^oa 
Annul._ 
Def t . . 
Type of hearing: Div. 
P r e s e n t ^ RJtf \A \ 
P- Atty:4j^ffiZ31M2 
D. At ty:"n^^V\^AA\ £ Z 
Sworn ^/Examined: 
Pltf: _ j k - \ . . Deft: ; / 
Supp. Order_ OSC.„ Other T f c 1 PrU 
Summons, 
Waiver 
Stipulation. 
Pub l ica t ion. 
Others: K l f f i f 7 0 \A1 QJOA; C XATJUJUU? fc. fojfo/LS^Ierk-
l » ' R p n n r 
• DefaulLpf Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: _§tP t 0 198S 
Judge: v C L D S . U M O 
LAVCi\v-£ ^ A C i A U 
Reporter: K6A) / V l t j f c A j 
Bailiff- HARRY KLEKAS iliff 
ORDERS: 
• Custody Evaluation Ordered . JH Custody AwardedJTo J 
§3 Visitation Rights l l M / l / y u W C tfiAL6UflA, ft £ £ £ / 3 / \ r 
D PJtf/Deft Awarded Support $_ 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $_ 
D Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
Atty. fees to t h e U l J A i AAXJH 
Home Tcv * * I 
= Per Month 
_ Per Month/Year G Alimony Waived 
in the amount of $A*rDO ~! v&~ VX^^^noo^W® pa+f^u 
• Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
n Pltf/Deft, to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft, to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against 
Automobile To: 
• Pltf/Deft, Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $. 
• 90-Day Waiting Period i 
!$ Divorce Granted To 
^ Decree To Become F 
CJ Former Name of _ 
L&TJ&!UAX1JJ 
i na : §5 Upon Entry ) 
As aoA \VvVo WJL vuirtA-
LJ 3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restored 
L J Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnabfe Bait. 
LJ Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
L J Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiffs counsel, court orders 
UNIVERSITY CLUB BUILDING 
136 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 1530 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 531-6222 
1500 EAST BETHANY HOME ROAD 
SUITE 130 
PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85014 
(602) 230-2333 
* fTxd(£i i 
>6r 1 9 8 8 
Dirk Eastmondf Esq. 
Sandy State Bank Building 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Dear Mr. Eastraond: 
At your request I have prepared an analysis at the 
present value of the pension benefits accruing to Larry and Faye 
Hurst from Kennecott. This analysis is based upon the following 
facts and assumptions: 
1. A letter dated November 4, 1987 from J. Robert 
Shields, Personnel Manager at Kennecott, indicated that Mr. Hurst 
will receive a pension benefit of $754.51 per month to age 62. 
Upon reaching age 62 the benefit will be reduced to 
month through the end of his life. In the event of 
death, Mrs. Hurst will begin to receive $249.98 per 
remainder of her life. 
$454.51 per 
Mr. Hurst's 
month for th< 
2. Larry Hurst is presently 54 years of age, and has a 
life expectancy of 22.5 years. Faye Hurst is presently 50 years 
of age. If Mrs. Hurst is alive at the end of Mr. Hurst's life 
expectancy, she will then have a life expectancy of 13.2 years. 
The probability that she will be alive in 22.5 years is 
approximately 77.77 percent. Life expectancies are based upon 
statistics prepared by the National Center for Health Statistics 
for 1985. 
3. A discount rate of 8.1 percent compounded monthly 
is based upon short, medium, and long term U.S. government 
securities. This represents a relatively risk-free rate of 
return"a person could expect to receive over periods of time 
reflected in the forecasts included with this letter. 
Based upon these facts and assumotions, the October lf 
1988 present value of Mr* Hurst's future Kennecott retirement 
benefit from the beginning of 1988 through the end of his life 
expectancy amounts to $76,328* The October 1, 1938 present value 
of Mrs. Hurst's retirement benefit from the end of Mr. Hurst's 
life expectancy to the end of her own life expectancy is $4f057. 
Reducing Mrs. Hurst's pension benefit based upon the 77.77 
percent probability she will live to the end of L^rry Hurst's 
life expectancy yields $3,155. 
The value of Mr. Hurst's retirement benefit since 
August 1986 through September 1988 (26 months) is $21,343 when 
accumulated at 8 percent interest, and $19,617.26 without 
interest. 
Schedules detailing these calculations are enclosed 
with this letter. 
Thank you for the opportunity to assist you in this 
matter. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know. 
Best regards, 
• ' // /> /J -
Charles E. Peterson 
kh 
Enclosures 
LARRY W. HURST 
PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE KENNECOTT PENSION 
DISCOUNT RATE = .08100 
DATE OF CALCULATION SEPTEMBER 2 4 , 1988 
PRESENT VALUE AS OF OCTOBER 1 , 1988 
DATE 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
TOTALS 
VALUE AT 
PRESENT VALUE DATE 
2,233.31 
8,495.87 
7,836.97 
7,229.17 
6,668.51 
6,151.33 
5,674.26 
5,234.19 
3,465.23 
2,682.93 
2,474.85 
2,282.91 
2,105.86 
1,942.54 
1,791.89 
1,652.92 
1,524.72 
1,406.47 
1,297.39 
1,196.77 
1,103.96 
1,018.34 
857.89 
; 76,328.31 
DISCOUNT 
FACTOR 
.980020 
.904015 
.833903 
.769230 
.709572 
.654541 
.603778 
.556952 
.513757 
.473912 
.437158 
.403254 
.371980 
.343131 
.316519 
.291971 
.269327 
.248440 
.229172 
.211398 
.195003 
.179880 
VALUE AT 
BEGINNING 
OF YEAR 
2,233.31 
8,669.07 
8,669.07 
8,669.07 
8,669.07 
8,669.07 
8,669.07 
8,669.07 
6,221.77 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
5,222.17 
4,769.25 
ANNUAL 
AMOUNT 
2,263.53 
9,054.12 
9,054.12 
9,054.12 
9,054.12 
9,054.12 
9,054.12 
9,054.12 
6,498.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5.454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
5,454.12 
4,963.25 
148,007.30 
August 1936 t o September 1988 p e n s i o n o a y n e n t s 
a c c u m u l a t e d a t 8 p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t amount t o $21,34 3 
o r $19 ,617 w i t h o u t i n t e r e s t . 
FAYE HURST 
PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE KENNECOTT PENSION 
DISCOUNT RATE = .08100 
DATE OF CALCULATION SEPTEMBER 24, 1988 
PRESENT VALUE AS OF NOVEMBER 28, 2010 
DATE 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
TOTALS 
VALUE AT 
PRESENT VALUE DATE 
268.10 
2,851.40 
2,630.26 
2,426.27 
2,238.10 
2,064.52 
1,904.40 
1,756.71 
1,620.47 
1,494.79 
1,378.86 
1,271.92 
1,173.28 
1,082.29 
113.80 
: 24,275.15 
DISCOUNT 
FACTOR 
.992761 
.915767 
.844744 
.779230 
.718797 
.663050 
.611627 
.564192 
.520436 
.480073 
.442841 
.408497 
.376815 
.347591 
VALUE AT 
BEGINNING 
OF YEAR 
268.10 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
2,872.19 
327.41 
ANNUAL 
AMOUNT 
269.98 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
2,999.76 
329.97 
39,596.83 
Present Value As Of October 1, 1980: $4,057 
Probability Mrs. Hurst Surviving 
To November 2 010: x .7777 
$3,]55 
1
 I SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26TH, 1988; 10:30 A.M. 
2 
3
 THE COURT: THIS IS THE CASE OF FAYE DORIS HURST VERSUS 
4 LARRY W. HURST, D87-3200. CAN WE HAVE COUNSEL IDENTIFY THEMSEL 
5
 FOR THE RECORD? 
6
 MR. EASTMOND: DIRK EASTMOND, APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
7
 MR. BLACKHAM: DON BLACKHAM, APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
8
 THE COURT: THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW THAT THE COURT HAD 
9
 BOTH COUNSEL IN CHAMBERS AND WE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER QUITE 
1° THOROUGHLY AND THERE'S CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN 
11 MADE. SO IF YOU CAN HAVE YOUR WITNESSES IDENTIFY THEM AND 
12
 THEN PROFFER TO THE COURT WHAT THEY WOULD TESTIFY TO. 
1 3
 MR. EASTMOND: ALL RIGHT. 
14
 J THE COURT: AND THEN -- MAYBE WE CAN SWEAR ALL THE WITNESSE 
15
 IN RIGHT NOW. 
16
 MR. EASTMOND: EXCEPT FOR THE PARTIES, THOSE ARE ALL WIT-
1 7
 NESSES. 
18
 THE COURT: HAVE THE PARTIES SWORN, TOO. RAISE YOUR HAND 
19
 AND BE SWORN. 
2 0
 (THE WITNESSES WERE SWORN.) 
21
 THE COURT: NOW, THE COURT HAS INDICATED TO COUNSEL THAT 
22 WHAT THE COURT WOULD LIKE TO DO IS HAVE COUNSEL TALK WITH YOU 
2 3
 J INFORMALLY OUTSIDE, BUT YOUTRE UNDER OATH SO YOU ARE REQUIRED 
BY THE COURT TO TflL THE TRUTH AND THIS WILL BF CONTINUED UNTIL 24 
'
5
 1 W E G E T T H E M A T T £ R ^ F I L L J . SO YOU MAY i\01 BE HERE. 
\ s s < K I \1 I D PKOPI s s i ( ) \ \ i KM POK 1 ! Ks 
0 KEAh\s HU t l\v. 
S\ l l \KL v. ITN M \H 
